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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Appellants are tour guides in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who allege that an 
ordinance of the City of Philadelphia (“City”) unconstitutionally infringes on their 
freedom of speech because it requires them to obtain a tour guide certificate from the City 
before giving certain tours. To obtain a certificate, they must pass a written test and meet 
other requirements that the ordinance establishes. Due to the City’s budget crisis, 
however, the City has not yet begun to develop the written test or taken any other action 
 3 
toward creating the tour guide certificate program, and it has no concrete plans to do so in 
the foreseeable future. In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the District Court found 
that the case was not ripe and dismissed the complaint.  We agree, and will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 As we write only for the parties, a brief summary of the facts will suffice. On April 
16, 2008, the Mayor of Philadelphia signed a bill enacting an ordinance (“Ordinance”) 
that provided that “[n]o person shall act as a tour guide on any public right-of-way within 
the Center City Tourist Area unless such person possesses a tour guide certificate issued 
in accordance with this Section.” (R. at 371.) There is no dispute that appellants are “tour 
guide[s]” who give tours covered by the Ordinance.  
The Ordinance identifies several requirements which must be satisfied before one 
can obtain a tour guide certificate, including passing a written examination, to be 
developed by the City, that will be “designed to test the applicant’s knowledge of the 
geography, history, historic sites, historic structures, historic objects and other places of 
interest in the Center City Tourist Area.”1
                                                 
1 A tour guide would be exempt from taking the written exam, although not from 
the Ordinance’s other requirements, if his or her employer offered its own educational 
program that the City found to be “equivalent to or exceed[ing] the written examination.” 
(R. at 373.) 
 (Id. at 372.) Those who engage in conduct 
covered by the Ordinance who do not have a tour guide certificate are subject to fines 
and, for repeat offenders, loss of a business privilege license. Appellants challenge only 
the portions of the Ordinance that make a tour guide certificate mandatory; in other 
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words, they would not object to a voluntary certification scheme. 
City Representative Melanie Johnson, who is responsible for “the promotion and 
marketing of the City of Philadelphia” (id. at 68), testified at the hearing in the District 
Court on the then-plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary and permanent injunction. Johnson’s 
office would administer the tour guide certificate program, but she testified that the City 
had neither the money nor the staff to develop the written test or other aspects of the tour 
guide certificate program and that it had no immediate plans to do so. The budget crisis in 
Philadelphia led to a hiring freeze and budget cuts, and the budget for the City 
Representative’s office in 2010 was projected to be significantly less than that for 2009.2
At oral argument before us,
 
Johnson testified that enforcing the Ordinance was nonetheless “[a]bsolutely” important 
to the City. (Id. at 119.) When Johnson was asked if she was “disavowing any intention of 
enforcing the ordinance if [the City was] allowed to,” she responded, “Not at all.” (Id. at 
122.)  
3
                                                 
2 There is nothing in the record regarding the City’s budget for 2011 or future 
years. 
 however, the City said that it has “disavowed” 
enforcing the Ordinance “for the foreseeable future” and agreed that, practically speaking, 
the City cannot enforce the Ordinance until it develops the written test and puts into place 
a process by which tour guides can obtain tour guide certificates. The City told us that the 
disavowal will end when it announces the first written test on the City’s website and “in a 
3 Appellants’ claims must remain ripe throughout the litigation, and the City’s 
comments at oral argument are therefore pertinent to our ripeness analysis. 
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newspaper of general circulation,” as the Ordinance requires. (See id. at 372.) 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Appellants do not challenge the Court’s factual 
findings, and we exercise plenary review over the Court’s determination that the case is 
not ripe. Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 
1462 (3d Cir. 1994). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The District Court held that the City’s “present inability to enforce [the Ordinance] 
vitiates ripeness” and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 
at 2.) The only question before us is whether appellants’ free-speech challenge to the 
Ordinance is ripe, despite the fact that the City’s financial difficulties prevent it from 
developing the written test and other parts of the tour guide certificate program, which in 
turn renders the City unable to enforce the Ordinance at this time or in the foreseeable 
future.  
In analyzing ripeness, the inquiry is whether appellants have brought their claims 
at the right time, i.e., whether the “dispute is sufficiently concrete” such that the District 
Court could avoid issuing an advisory opinion. Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 
433 (3d Cir. 2003). To be ripe, there must be “a real and substantial controversy admitting 
of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an 
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opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Presbytery, 
40 F.3d at 1463 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a case is ripe, 
we generally examine “the adversity of the interest of the parties, the conclusiveness of 
the judicial judgment and the practical help, or utility, of that judgment.”4
 Appellants’ facial free-speech challenge “is subject to a relaxed ripeness standard.” 
Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 434. We have “allowed somewhat liberally” such challenges prior 
to any government enforcement of a restriction on speech. Id. at 435. We do so because of 
our concerns that (1) “a person will merely comply with an illegitimate statute rather than 
be subjected to prosecution” and (2) “the government may choose never to put the law to 
the test by initiating a prosecution, while the presence of the statute on the books 
nonetheless chills constitutionally protected conduct.” Id. Appellants argue that the 
second concern is precisely what is at issue here, but in this case there is no evidence that 
the speech of any tour guide has been chilled. Given the City’s statement at oral argument 
that it has “disavowed” enforcement of the Ordinance until it announces that a written test 
will be administered, moreover, we see no reason that speech would be chilled before, at 
the earliest, that announcement. 
 Step-Saver 
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990).  
                                                 
4 We may consider other factors in analyzing ripeness, but no party suggests that 
we do so here. NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 342 n.9 
(3d Cir. 2001).  
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 We will proceed to analyze the ripeness of appellants’ free-speech claims 
according to the three Step-Saver factors. 
 A. Adversity of Interest 
There may be adversity of interest without a “completed harm,” but “it is necessary 
that there be a substantial threat of real harm and that the threat must remain real and 
immediate throughout the course of the litigation.” Presbytery, 40 F.3d at 1463 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). When a government body promises not to enforce a restriction 
against a plaintiff, or at all, there is no longer “a substantial threat of real harm” because 
“intervening events [have] remove[d] the possibility of harm.” Id.; see also Salvation 
Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a claim 
was not ripe as to certain regulations when there was “an express assurance that there will 
be no enforcement” of those provisions).  The District Court held that the City’s claimed 
inability to enforce the Ordinance at this time is equivalent to a promise not to enforce the 
Ordinance, and at oral argument the City went further and stated that it “disavowed” 
enforcement of the Ordinance until it announces that a written test will be administered. 
In Presbytery, we held that the threat of prosecution for one individual plaintiff 
was “real and substantial” because the state “refus[ed] to waive prosecution” against him 
outside of his capacity as a member of the clergy. Presbytery, 40 F.3d at 1468 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 435 (citing Presbytery for the 
proposition that “in cases involving fundamental rights, even the remotest threat of 
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prosecution, such as the absence of a promise not to prosecute, has supported a holding of 
ripeness where the issues in the case were ‘predominantly legal’ and did not require 
additional factual development”). Appellants argue that they face the same threat as the 
plaintiff in Presbytery because the City has not wholly disavowed enforcement of the 
Ordinance but rather plans to enforce it at an unknown future time. Presbytery is, 
however, distinguishable from this case. In Presbytery, there was no identifiable 
impediment to the state’s enforcement of the statute against the individual plaintiff. Here, 
by contrast, the City must do a good deal of work, most notably developing the written 
test, before it can begin to enforce the Ordinance.  
We express no opinion as to when, if at all, this case will become ripe, much less 
whether it may become ripe before the City announces the first written test. The only 
question before us is whether the case is ripe now, where there is (1) a significant and 
identifiable task – creating the tour guide certificate program – that the City must 
complete before it is able to enforce the Ordinance, (2) no evidence in the record that the 
City will create the program in the foreseeable future, and (3) no evidence that the speech 
of anyone is being or has been chilled. Under these circumstances, we agree with the 
District Court that there is not a substantial and immediate threat of real harm. 
 B. Conclusiveness of the Judicial Judgment 
“The conclusivity inquiry . . . goes to whether the parties’ rights will be 
definitively decided by a declaratory judgment.” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9. We ask 
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“[w]hether issues are purely legal (as against factual)” and “[w]hether further factual 
development would be useful.” NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 342 n.9. We agree with the 
District Court that a declaratory judgment would determine the rights of both parties, and 
this factor therefore weighs in favor of ripeness.  
C. Utility  
“The utility inquiry . . . goes . . . to whether the parties’ plans of actions [sic] are 
likely to be affected by a declaratory judgment.” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9. We look 
at the “[h]ardship to the parties of withholding decision” and “[w]hether the claim 
involves uncertain and contingent events.” NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 342 n.9. The 
District Court found that there was no utility because although a judgment in the then-
plaintiffs’ favor might put them “at ease,” they did not “demonstrate[] that having [the 
Ordinance] on the books without present enforcement would cause real-world behavioral 
modification or suppression of speech.” (R. at 20-21.) Regarding utility, appellants again 
rely on Presbytery, in which the individual plaintiff claimed that he would violate the 
restriction at issue regardless of the court’s decision and we nonetheless “assume[d that] 
his willingness to do so [was] likely to be affected by resolution of th[e] action.” 
Presbytery, 40 F.3d at 1470. We see no reason to make that assumption here, and we 
agree with the District Court that a judgment would have no utility because there is no 
evidence that it would have a real-world effect on anyone. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Having weighed the Step-Saver factors, we conclude that this case is not ripe, and 
we will therefore affirm the order of the District Court.   
 
